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Abstract— This paper considers a time-varying game with N
players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events
and then take a control action. The events and control actions
affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The goal is
to maximize a concave function of time average utilities subject
to equilibrium constraints. Specifically, participating players are
provided access to a common source of randomness from which
they can optimally correlate their decisions. The equilibrium
constraints incentivize participation by ensuring that players
cannot earn more utility if they choose not to participate. This
form of equilibrium is similar to the notions of Nash equilibrium
and correlated equilibrium, but is simpler to attain. A Lyapunov
method is developed that solves the problem in an online max-
weight fashion by selecting actions based on a set of time-
varying weights. The algorithm does not require knowledge of
the event probabilities and has polynomial convergence time. A
similar method can be used to compute a standard correlated
equilibrium, albeit with increased complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a repeated game with N players and one game
manager. The game is played over an infinite sequence of
time slots t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Every slot t there is a random
event vector ω(t) = (ω0(t), ω1(t), . . . , ωN(t)). The game
manager observes the full vector ω(t), while each player
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} observes only the component ωi(t). The value
ω0(t) represents information known only to the manager. After
the slot t event is observed, the game manager sends a message
to each player i. Based on this message, the players choose a
control action αi(t). The random event and the collection of
all control actions for slot t determine individual utilities ui(t)
for each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Each player is interested in
maximizing the time average of its own utility process. The
game manager is interested in providing messages that lead to
a fair allocation of time average utilities across players.
Specifically, let ui be the time average of ui(t). The fairness
of an achieved vector of time average utilities is defined
by a concave fairness function φ(u1, . . . , uN ). The goal is
to devise strategies that maximize φ(u1, . . . , uN ) subject to
certain game-theoretic equilibrium constraints. For example,
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suppose the fairness function is a sum of logarithms:
φ(u1, . . . , uN ) =
N∑
i=1
log(ui)
This corresponds to proportional fair utility maximization,
a concept often studied in the context of communication
networks [2]. Another natural concave fairness function is:
φ(u1, . . . , uN ) = min[u1, . . . , uN , c]
for some given constant c > 0. This fairness function assigns
no added value when the average utility of one player exceeds
that of another.
Let M (t) = (M1(t), . . . ,MN(t)) be the message vector
provided by the game manager on slot t. The value Mi(t) is
an element of the set Ai and represents the action the manager
would like player i to take. A player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is said
to participate if she always chooses the suggestion of the
manager, that is, if αi(t) = Mi(t) for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. At
the beginning of the game, each player makes a participation
agreement. Participating players receive the messages Mi(t),
while non-participating players do not.
This paper considers the class of algorithms that deliver
message vectors M(t) as a stationary and randomized func-
tion of the observed ω(t). Assuming that all players partici-
pate, this induces a conditional probability distribution on the
actions, given the current ω(t). The conditional distribution is
defined as a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) if it yields
a time average utility vector (u1, . . . , uN ) with the following
property [3]: For each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the average
utility ui is at least as large as the maximum time average
utility this player could achieve if she did not participate
(assuming the actions of all other players do not change).
Overall, the goal is to maximize φ(u1, . . . , uN ) subject to the
CCE constraints.
A. Contributions and related work
The notion of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) was
introduced in [3] in the static case where there is no event
process ω(t). The CCE definition is similar to a correlated
equilibrium (CE) [4][5][6]. The difference is as follows: A
correlated equilibrium (CE) is more stringent and requires the
utility achieved by each player i to be at least as large as the
utility she could achieve if she did not participate but if she still
knew the Mi(t) messages on every slot. It is known that both
CCE and CE constraints can be written as linear programs.
2Adaptive methods that converge to a CE for static games are
developed in [7][8][9]. The concept of Nash equilibrium (NE)
is more stringent still: The NE constraint requires all players
to act independently and without the aid of a message process
M(t) [10][6]. Unfortunately, the problem of computing a
Nash equilibrium is nonconvex.
This paper uses the NE, CE, and CCE concepts in the
context of a stochastic game with random events ω(t). The
optimal action associated with a particular event can depend
on whether or not the event is rare. This paper develops an
online algorithm that is influenced by the event probabilities,
but does not require knowledge of these probabilities. The
algorithm uses the Lyapunov optimization theory of [11][12]
and is of the max-weight type. Specifically, every slot t, the
game manager observes the ω(t) realization and chooses a
suggestion vector by greedily minimizing a drift-plus-penalty
expression. Such Lyapunov methods are used extensively in
the context of queueing networks [13][14] (see also related
methods in [15][16][17]). This is perhaps the first use of such
techniques in a game-theoretic setting.
One reason the solution of this paper can have a simple
structure is that the random event process ω(t) is assumed to
be independent of the prior control actions. Specifically, while
the components ωi(t) are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated
across i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, the vector ω(t) is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over slots. Prior
work on stochastic games considers more complex problems
where ω(t + 1) is influenced by the control action of slot t,
including work in [18] which studies correlated equilibria in
this context. This typically involves Markov decision theory
and has high complexity. Specifically, if Ωi is the set of all
possible values of ωi(t), and if |Ωi| is the (finite) size of this
set, then complexity is typically at least as large as
∏N
i=1 |Ωi|.
In contrast, while the current paper treats a stochastic
problem with more limited structure, the resulting solution is
simple and grows as
∑N
i=1 |Ωi|. Specifically, the algorithm
uses a number of virtual queues that is linear in N , rather
than exponential in N , resulting in polynomial bounds on
convergence time. Furthermore, the number of virtual queues
grows only linearly in the size of each set Ωi. This improves
on the original conference version of this paper [1], which
required a number of virtual queues that was exponential in
the size of Ωi. The exponential-to-polynomial improvement is
done by equivalently modeling the constraints via a grouping
of conditional expectations given an observed random event.
II. STATIC GAMES
This section introduces the problem in the static case with-
out random processes ω0(t), ω1(t), . . . , ωN (t). The different
forms of equilibrium are defined and compared through a
simple example. The general stochastic problem is treated in
Section III.
Suppose there are N players, where N is an integer larger
than 1. Each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} has an action space Ai,
assumed to be a finite set. The game operates in slotted time
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Every slot t, each player i chooses an action
αi(t) ∈ Ai. Let α(t) = (α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) be the vector of
control actions on slot t. The utility ui(t) earned by player i
on slot t is a real-valued function of α(t):
ui(t) = uˆi(α(t)) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
The utility functions uˆi(α) can be different for each player i.
Define A = A1×· · ·×AN . Consider starting with a particular
vector α ∈ A and modifying it by changing a single entry i
from αi to some other action βi. This new vector is represented
by the notation (βi,αi). Define Ai as the set of all vectors
αi, being the set product of Aj over all j 6= i.
The three different forms of equilibrium considered in this
section are defined by probability mass functions Pr[α] for
α ∈ A. It is assumed throughout that:
• Pr[α] ≥ 0 for all α ∈ A.
•
∑
α∈A Pr[α] = 1.
If actions α(t) are chosen independently every slot according
to the same probability mass function Pr[α], the law of large
numbers ensures that, with probability 1, the time average
utility of each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is:
ui =
∑
α∈A Pr[α]uˆi(α)
A. Nash equilibrium (NE)
The standard concept of Nash equilibrium from [19][10]
assumes players take independent actions, so that:
Pr[α] =
N∏
i=1
Pr[αi(t) = αi] (1)
A probability mass function Pr[α] is a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium (NE) if it satisfies:∑
α∈A
Pr[α]uˆi(α) ≥
∑
α∈A
Pr[α]uˆi(βi,αi)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀βi ∈ Ai (2)
B. Correlated equilibrium (CE)
The standard concept of correlated equilibrium from [4][5]
can be motivated by a game manager that provides suggested
actions (α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) every slot t, where player 1 only
sees α1(t), player 2 only sees α2(t), and so on. Assume the
suggestion vector is independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) over slots with some probability mass function Pr[α].
Assume all players participate, so that every slot their chosen
actions match the suggestions. The probability mass function
Pr[α] is a correlated equilibrium (CE) if:∑
α
i
∈A
i
Pr[αi,αi]uˆi(αi,αi) ≥
∑
α
i
∈A
i
Pr[αi,αi]uˆi(βi,αi)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀αi ∈ Ai, ∀βi ∈ Ai with βi 6= αi (3)
These constraints imply that no player can gain a larger
average utility by individually deviating from the suggestions
of the game manager [5]. This can be understood as follows:
Fix an i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and an αi ∈ Ai such that Pr[αi(t) =
αi] > 0. Divide both sides of the above inequality by
Pr[αi(t) = αi]. Then:
3• The left-hand-side is the conditional expected utility of
player i, given that all players participate and that player
i sees suggestion αi on the current slot.
• The right-hand-side is the conditional expected utility of
player i, given that she sees αi on the current slot, that all
other players j 6= i participate, and that player i chooses
action βi instead of αi (so player i does not participate).
The correlated equilibrium constraints are linear in the
Pr[α] variables. Define |Ai| as the number of actions in set
Ai. The number of linear constraints specified by (3) is then:∑N
i=1 |Ai|(|Ai| − 1) (4)
C. Coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE)
The definition of correlated equilibrium assumes that non-
participating players still receive the suggestions from the
game manager. As the suggestion αi(t) for player i may
be correlated with the suggestions αj(t) of other players
j 6= i, this can give a non-participating player i a great
deal of information about the likelihood of actions from other
players. The following simple modification assumes that non-
participating players do not receive any suggestions from the
game manager. A probability mass function Pr[α] is a coarse
correlated equilibrium (CCE) if it satisfies the constraints (2).
Note that the product form constraints (1) are not required.
This CCE definition was introduced in [3]. Similar to the
CE case, these CCE constraints imply that no player can
increase her average utility by individually deviating from the
suggestions of the game manager.
The CCE constraints (2) are linear in the Pr[α] values. The
number of CCE constraints is:∑N
i=1 |Ai|
This number is typically much less than the number of
constraints required for a CE, specified in (4). Assuming that
|Ai| ≥ 2 for each player i (so that each player has at least 2
action options), the number of CCE constraints is always less
than or equal to the number of CE constraints, with equality
if and only if |Ai| = 2 for all players i.
D. A superset result
The assumption that all sets Ai are finite make the game
a finite game. Fix a finite game and define ENE , ECE , and
ECCE as the set of all probability mass functions Pr[α]
that define a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium, a correlated
equilibrium, and a coarse correlated equilibrium, respectively.
It is known that every such finite game has at least one mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium, and so ENE is nonempty [19][10].
Furthermore, it is known that any NE is also a CE, and any
CE is also a CCE, so that [4][5][3]:
ENE ⊆ ECE ⊆ ECCE (5)
Furthermore, the sets ECE and ECCE are closed, bounded, and
convex [4][5][3].
E. A simple example
Consider a game where player 1 has three control options
and player 2 has two control options:
A1 = {α, β, γ} , A2 = {α, β}
The utility functions uˆ1(α1, α2) and uˆ2(α1, α2) are specified
in the table of Fig. 1, where player 1 actions are listed by row
and player 2 actions are listed by column.
Utility 1 Utility 2 Probabilities
α β
α 2 5
β 4 2
γ 3 5
α β
α 50 1
β 2 4
γ 3 0
α β
α a b
β c d
γ e f
Fig. 1. Example utility functions uˆ1(α1, α2) and uˆ2(α1, α2).
There are six possible action vectors (α1, α2). Define the
mass function Pr[α] by values a, b, c, d, e, f associated with
each of the six possibilities, as shown in Fig. 1.
The eight CE constraints for this problem are:
player 1 sees α: 2a+ 5b ≥ 4a+ 2b
player 1 sees α: 2a+ 5b ≥ 3a+ 5b
player 1 sees β: 4c+ 2d ≥ 2c+ 5d
player 1 sees β: 4c+ 2d ≥ 3c+ 5d
player 1 sees γ: 3e+ 5f ≥ 2e+ 5f
player 1 sees γ: 3e+ 5f ≥ 4e+ 2f
player 2 sees α: 50a+ 2c+ 3e ≥ a+ 4c+ 0e
player 2 sees β: b+ 4d+ 0f ≥ 50b+ 2d+ 3f
It can be shown that there is a single probability mass function
Pr[α] that satisfies all of these CE constraints:
a = b = 0, c = 0.45, d = 0.15, e = 0.3, f = 0.1
This is also the only NE. The average utility vector associated
with this mass function is (u1, u2) = (3.5, 2.4).
In contrast, the five CCE constraints for this problem are:
player 1 chooses α: 2a+ 5b+ 4c+ 2d+ 3e+ 5f
≥ 2(a+ c+ e) + 5(b+ d+ f)
player 1 chooses β: 2a+ 5b+ 4c+ 2d+ 3e+ 5f
≥ 4(a+ c+ e) + 2(b+ d+ f)
player 1 chooses γ: 2a+ 5b+ 4c+ 2d+ 3e+ 5f
≥ 3(a+ c+ e) + 5(b+ d+ f)
player 2 chooses α: 50a+ b+ 2c+ 4d+ 3e
≥ 50(a+ b) + 2(c+ d) + 3(e+ f)
player 2 chooses β: 50a+ b+ 2c+ 4d+ 3e
≥ 1(a+ b) + 4(c+ d) + 0(e+ f)
There are an infinite number of probability mass functions
Pr[α] that satisfy these CCE constraints. Three different
ones are given in the table of Fig. 2, labeled distribution 1,
distribution 2, and distribution 3. Distribution 1 corresponds
to the CE and NE distribution.
4The set of all utility vectors (u1, u2) achievable under CCE
constraints is the triangular region shown in Fig. 3. The three
vertices of the triangle correspond to the three distributions in
Fig. 2, and are:
(u1, u2) ∈ {(3.5, 2.4), (3.5, 9.3), (3.8773, 3.7914)}
The point (3.5, 2.4) is the lower left vertex of the trian-
gle and corresponds to the CE (and NE) distribution. It is
clear that both players can significantly increase their utility
by changing from CE constraints to CCE constraints. This
illustrates the following general principle: All players benefit
if non-participants are denied access to the suggestions of the
game manager. This principle is justified by (5).
Distribution 1 Distribution 2 Distribution 3
α β
α 0 0
β .45 .15
γ .30 .10
α β
α .15 0
β .60 .15
γ 0 .10
α β
α .0368 0
β .9018 .0368
γ 0 .0245
Fig. 2. Three different probability distributions that satisfy the CCE
constraints. The first distribution also satisfies the CE and NE constraints.
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(3.7323, 5.9091)
(3.5, 2.4)
(3.5, 9.3)
(3.8773, 3.7914)
NE and CE point
Fig. 3. The region of (u1, u2) values achievable under CCE constraints. All
points inside and on the triangle are achievable. The NE and CCE point is the
lower left vertex. The point (3.7323, 5.9091) is the solution to the convex
optimization example of Section II-F.
F. Utility optimization with equilibrium constraints
There are typically many probability distributions Pr[α]
that satisfy the CCE constraints. The goal is to find one that
leads to an optimal vector of average utilities. Optimality is
determined by a concave fairness function, as defined below.
For convenience, assume all utility functions are nonnega-
tive. Define umaxi as an upper bound on the utility for each
player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, so that:
0 ≤ uˆi(α) ≤ u
max
i ∀α ∈ A
Define φ(u1, . . . , uN) as a continuous and concave function
that maps the set ×Ni=1[0, umaxi ] to the real numbers. This
is called the fairness function. The game manager chooses a
probability mass function Pr[α] with the goal of maximizing
φ(u1, . . . , uN ) subject to CCE constraints:
Maximize: φ(u1, . . . , uN ) (6)
Subject to: ui =∑α∈A Pr[α]uˆi(α) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (7)
Pr[α] ≥ 0 ∀α ∈ A (8)∑
α∈A Pr[α] = 1 (9)
CCE constraints (2) are satisfied (10)
The above is a convex optimization problem. If the CCE
constraints are replaced by the CE constraints (3), the problem
remains convex but can have significantly more constraints. If
the CCE constraints are replaced with the NE constraints (1)-
(2), the problem becomes nonconvex.
Consider the special case example of Section II-E with
fairness function given by:
φ(u1, u2) = 10 log(1 + u1) + log(1 + u2)
where player 1 is given a higher priority. The optimal utility
is (u∗1, u∗2) = (3.7323, 5.9091), plotted in Fig. 3.
III. STOCHASTIC GAMES
Let ω(t) = (ω0(t), ω1(t), . . . , ωN(t)) be a vector of random
events for slot t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Each component ωi(t) takes
values in some finite set Ωi, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}. Define
Ω = Ω0×Ω1×· · ·×ΩN . The vector process ω(t) is assumed
to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over slots
with probability mass function:
π[ω]△=Pr[ω(t) = ω] ∀ω ∈ Ω
where the notation “△=” means “defined to be equal to.”
On each slot t, the components of the vector ω(t) can be
arbitrarily correlated.
At the beginning of each slot t, each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
observes its own random event ωi(t). The game manager
observes the full vector ω(t), including the additional infor-
mation ω0(t). It then sends a suggested action Mi(t) to each
participating player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Assume Mi(t) ∈ Ai,
where Ai is the finite set of actions available to player i. Each
player i chooses an action αi(t) ∈ Ai. Participating players
always choose αi(t) = Mi(t). Non-participating players do
not receive Mi(t) and choose αi(t) using knowledge of only
ωi(t) and of events that occurred before slot t.
Let α(t) = (α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) be the action vector. The
utility ui(t) earned by each player i on slot t is a function of
α(t) and ω(t):
ui(t) = uˆi(α(t),ω(t))
For convenience, assume utility functions are nonnegative with
maximum values umaxi for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, so that:
0 ≤ uˆi(α(t),ω(t)) ≤ u
max
i
5A. Discussion of game structures
This model can be used to treat various game structures.
For example, the scenario where all players have full in-
formation can be treated by defining ωi(t) = ω0(t) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. This is useful in games related to economic
markets, where ω0(t) can represent a commonly known vector
of current prices. Alternatively, one can imagine a game with
a single random event process ω0(t) that is known to the game
manager but unknown to all players. For example, consider a
game defined over a wireless multiple access system. Wireless
users are players in the game, and the access point is the
game manager. In this example, ω0(t) can represent a vector
of current channel conditions known only to the access point.
Such games can be treated by setting ωi(t) to a default
constant value for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all slots t.
B. Pure strategies and the virtual static game
Assume all players participate, so that Mi(t) = αi(t) for
all i. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, denote the sizes of sets Ωi
and Ai by |Ωi| and |Ai|, respectively. Define a pure strategy
function for player i as a function bi(ωi) that maps Ωi to the
set Ai. There are |Ai||Ωi| such functions. Define:
Si
△
={1, 2, . . . , |Ai|
|Ωi|}
Enumerate the pure strategy functions for player i and repre-
sent them by b(s)i (ωi) for s ∈ Si. Define:
S △=S1 × S2 × · · · × SN
Each vector (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) ∈ S can be used to specify a
profile of pure strategies used by each player. For each s ∈ S
and each ω ∈ Ω, define:
b(s)(ω) = (b
(s1)
1 (ω1), b
(s2)
2 (ω2), . . . , b
(sN )
N (ωN )) (11)
In the special case when the action of each player i on
slot t is defined by pure strategy si, the action vector is
(α1(t), . . . , αN (t)) = b
(s)(ω(t)). The average utility earned
by player i on such a slot t is defined:
hi(s)
△
=
∑
ω∈Ω π[ω]uˆi(b
(s)(ω),ω) (12)
The stochastic game can be treated as a virtual static game
as follows: The virtual static game also has N players. The
virtual action space of each player i is viewed as the set of
pure strategies Si. Every slot t, each player i selects a pure
strategy si(t) ∈ Si. The virtual utility functions are given by
the functions hi(s).
The virtual static game is still a finite game. Hence, the NE,
CE, and CCE definitions for static games can be used here. In
particular, let Pr[s] be a probability mass function over the
finite set of strategy profiles s ∈ S. Then:
• (NE for virtual static game) Pr[s] is a NE for the virtual
static game if it has the product form:
Pr[s] =
N∏
i=1
gi[si] ∀s ∈ S (13)
where gi[si] = Pr[si(t) = si], and if:
∑
s∈S
Pr[s]hi(s) ≥
∑
s∈S
Pr[s]hi(ri, si)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀ri ∈ Si (14)
• (CE for virtual static game) Pr[s] is a CE for the virtual
static game if:
∑
s
i
∈S
i
Pr[si, si]hi(si, si) ≥
∑
s
i
∈S
i
Pr[si, si]hi(ri, si)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀si, ri ∈ Si (15)
• (CCE for virtual static game) Pr[s] is a CCE for the
virtual static game if it satisfies (14).
A given probability mass function Pr[s] defined over s ∈
S generates a conditional probability mass function Pr[α|ω]
defined over all α ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω:
Pr[α|ω] =
∑
s∈S Pr[s]1{b
(s)(ω) = α} (16)
where 1{b(s)(ω) = α} is an indicator function that is 1
if b(s)(ω) = α, and is 0 else. However, not all Pr[α|ω]
functions can be generated in this way.1
For example, the right-hand-side of (16) does not depend
on ω0. In contrast, a game manager might want to select
Pr[α|ω] as a function of the full random event vector ω =
(ω0, ω1, . . . , ωN ).
If (16) holds, a game manager with no knowledge of the
random event vector ω(t) could produce suggestions accord-
ing to Pr[α|ω] by randomly selecting a strategy vector s =
(s1, . . . , sN ) with probability Pr[s], and then broadcasting
component si to each player i. Thus, the NE, CE, and CCE
conditions in (13)-(15) for the virtual static game can be
viewed as information restricted (IR) notions of equilibrium
for the stochastic game. Formally, define a probability mass
function Pr[s] to be an IR-NE if it satisfies (13)-(14), an IR-
CE if it satisfies (15), and an IR-CCE if it satisfies (14).
Lemma 1: Suppose Pr[s] and Pr[α|ω] satisfy (16). If
Pr[s] has the product form (13), then Pr[α|ω] has the
following product form:
Pr[α|ω] =
N∏
i=1
Pr[αi|ωi] ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀α ∈ A (17)
1The conference version of this paper [1] contained an incorrect statement
suggesting that all Pr[α|ω] distributions can be generated by Pr[s] distri-
butions according to (16) (Lemma 1 from page 5 of [1]). While this is true
in the case when b(s)(ω) can be an arbitrary function of the full ω vector,
it does not hold for strategy functions with the structure (11). The author
regrets the misleading statement in [1]. Fortunately, that incorrect statement
was never used, and so it did not affect any of the results in [1].
6Proof: It follows by (16) that:
Pr[α|ω] =
∑
s∈S
N∏
i=1
gi[si]1{b
(s)(ω) = α}
=
∑
s∈S
N∏
i=1
gi[si]1{b
(si)
i (ωi) = αi}
=
( ∑
s1∈S1
g1[s1]1{b
(s1)
1 (ω1) = α1}
)
· · ·
( ∑
sN∈SN
gN [sN ]1{b
(sN)
N (ωN ) = αN}
)
= Pr[α1|ω1] · · ·Pr[αN |ωN ]
C. General equilibrium for the stochastic game
Let Pr[α|ω] be a conditional probability mass function
defined over ω ∈ Ω, α ∈ A. It is assumed throughout that:
Pr[α|ω] ≥ 0 ∀α ∈ A, ∀ω ∈ Ω (18)∑
α∈A Pr[α|ω] = 1 ∀ω ∈ Ω (19)
General equilibria for the stochastic game can be defined
in terms of Pr[α|ω]. The conference version of this paper
[1] does this by specifying constraints for each pure strategy
ri ∈ Si, similar to the virtual static game constraints (14)
and (15). Unfortunately, this requires a number of constraints
that is exponential in the size of the sets Ωi. The following
alternative definition is equivalent to that given in [1], yet uses
only a polynomial number of constraints. For the case of NE
and CCE, it does so by introducing additional variables θi(vi)
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and each vi ∈ Ωi. Intuitively, θi(vi)
represents the largest conditional expected utility achievable
by player i, given that she does not participate and that she
observes ωi(t) = vi.
• (NE for the stochastic game) Pr[α|ω] is a NE for the
stochastic game if it has the product form (17) and if
there are real numbers θi(vi) ∈ [0, umaxi ] such that:∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi(α,ω)
≥
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(ωi) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (20)
and ∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(vi)
≥
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi((βi,αi),ω)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀vi ∈ Ωi, ∀βi ∈ Ai (21)
• (CE for the stochastic game) Pr[α|ω] is a CE for the
stochastic game if there are real numbers θi(vi, ci) ∈
[0, umaxi ] such that:∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω][uˆi(α,ω)− θi(ωi, αi)] ≥ 0
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (22)
and ∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A|αi=ci
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(vi, ci)
≥
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A|αi=ci
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi ((βi,αi),ω)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀vi ∈ Ωi, ∀ci ∈ Ai, ∀βi ∈ Ai (23)
• (CCE for the stochastic game) Pr[α|ω] is a CCE for
the stochastic game if there are real numbers θi(vi) ∈
[0, umaxi ] such that the constraints (20)-(21) are satisfied.
The next lemma shows that every information restricted
equilibrium Pr[s] generates a general equilibrium Pr[α|s].
Lemma 2: Suppose Pr[s] and Pr[α|ω] satisfy (16). Then:
(a) Pr[s] satisfies the constraints (14) if and only if Pr[α|ω]
satisfies the constraints (20)-(21).
(b) Pr[s] satisfies the constraints (15) if and only if
Pr[α|ω] satisfies the constraints (22)-(23).
(c) If Pr[s] is a NE for the virtual static game, then Pr[α|ω]
is a NE for the stochastic game.
Proof: See Appendix A.
One may wonder if the constraints (20)-(21) can be stated
more simply by removing the θi(vi) variables. Indeed, one
may wonder if (20)-(21) are equivalent to:∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi(α,ω)
≥
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi ((βi,αi),ω)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, vi ∈ Ωi, βi ∈ Ai. This is not
generally the case. Indeed, the above constraints are more
restrictive and imply that the conditional expected utility of
player i, given she observes ωi(t) = vi, is greater than or
equal to the conditional expectation this player could achieve
given ωi(t) = vi and given that she does not participate. On
the other hand, the constraints (20)-(21) allow a violation of
this property for a given vi. Such a violation does not imply
that player i could improve beyond the utility associated with
participating. That is because that act of not participating may
itself decrease the achievable average utility in certain ωi states
by an amount that cannot be recovered by changing strategies
on other ωi states. This is a subtlety that does not arise in the
static game context without the ωi(t) processes.
Define EstocNE , EstocCE , EstocCCE as the set of all conditional
probability mass functions Pr[α|ω] that are NE, CE, and
CCE, respectively, for the stochastic game.
Lemma 3: For a general stochastic game as defined above:
(a) The set EstocNE is nonempty.
(b) EstocNE ⊆ EstocCE ⊆ EstocCCE .
(c) Sets EstocCE and EstocCCE are closed, bounded, and convex.
Proof: The virtual static game is finite and hence has at
least one mixed strategy NE Pr[s] [19][10]. Let Pr[α|ω] be
the corresponding conditional mass function defined by (16).
Then Pr[α|ω] is a NE for the stochastic game (by Lemma
2c), and so EstocNE is nonempty. This proves part (a).
To prove (c), note that EstocCCE is the intersection of the set
of all Pr[α|ω] that satisfy the (closed, bounded, and convex)
probability simplex constraints (18)-(19) and the set of all
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EstocCE is the intersection of all Pr[α|ω] that satisfy (18)-(19)
with all Pr[α|ω] that satisfy the linear constraints (22)-(23).
To prove that EstocCE ⊆ EstocCCE , suppose that Pr[α|ω] is a CE.
Then it satisfies the CE constraints (22)-(23) for some values
θi(vi, ci). Define:2
θi(vi)
△
=
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A Pr[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(vi, αi)∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A Pr[ω]Pr[α|ω]
These values satisfy θi(vi) ∈ [0, umaxi ]. Summing (23) over
ci ∈ Ai and applying the above definition of θi(vi) proves
that (20)-(21) hold. The proof that EstocNE ⊆ EstocCE is given in
Appendix B.
D. Complexity comparison
The CCE for the virtual static game is defined by the
constraints (14). There is one such constraint for each i ∈
{1, . . . , N} and each ri ∈ Si, where Si is the number of pure
strategies for player i. Thus, the number of constraints is:
N∑
i=1
|Si| =
N∑
i=1
|Ai|
|Ωi|
This grows exponentially in the size of the sets Ωi. Thus, even
though these constraints are linear, computation of a CCE for
the virtual static game can be very complex.
The CCE constraints for the stochastic game are given in
(20)-(21). There are N constraints in (20). For (21), there is
one such constraint for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, each vi ∈ Ωi,
and each βi ∈ Ai, for a total of:
N +
N∑
i=1
|Ωi||Ai|
This is linear in the sizes of the Ωi and Ai sets. Thus, the gen-
eral CCE constraints (20)-(21) provide a significant complexity
reduction. A similar “exponential-to-polynomial” complexity
reduction holds for the CE definition when comparing the
constraints in (15) to those in (22)-(23).
E. Unilateral changes cannot increase utility
The stochastic NE, CE, and CCE definitions above have the
following property: Assuming actions are chosen according to
an equilibrium mass function Pr[α|ω], a given player cannot
improve her utility by unilaterally deviating from these actions.
This is formalized in the lemmas below.
First note that if α(t) is chosen according to a mass function
Pr[α|ω], then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
E [ui(t)] =
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi(α,ω)
Now fix i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For all ωi ∈ Ω, let Xi(ωi) be a
random function that maps a point ωi ∈ Ωi to a randomly
chosen point Xi(ωi) ∈ Ai according to some distribution that
depends on ωi. It is assumed that for a given slot t, Xi(ωi(t))
2More precisely, the values θi(vi) are defined to be 0 in the special case
when
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A pi[ω]Pr[α|ω] = 0.
is conditionally independent of α(t) and ω(t) given ωi(t). The
expected utility on slot t associated with unilaterally changing
action αi(t) to action Xi(ωi(t)) is:∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]E [uˆi ((Xi(ωi),αi),ω)]
where the expectation on the right-hand-side is with respect
to the distribution of Xi(ωi).
Lemma 4: Pr[α|ω] satisfies (20)-(21) if and only if:
E [ui(t)] ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]E [uˆi ((Xi(ωi),αi),ω)]
(24)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all randomized functions Xi(ωi).
Proof: Suppose Pr[α|ω] satisfies (20)-(21). Fix i ∈
{1, . . . , N}. Fix a random function Xi(ωi), and define:
qi(βi|vi) = Pr[Xi(vi) = βi] ∀vi ∈ Ωi, βi ∈ Ai
Multiplying (21) by qi(βi|vi) and summing over βi ∈ Ai
gives:∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(vi)
≥
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]
∑
βi∈Ai
qi(βi|vi)uˆi((βi,αi),ω)
=
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]E [uˆi((Xi(vi),αi),ω)]
Summing both sides over vi ∈ Ωi and using (20) gives the
expression (24).
Now suppose (24) holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all
randomized functions Xi(ωi). Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For each
vi ∈ Ωi deterministically define Xi(vi) as the element β∗i
that maximizes the right-hand-side of (21) over all βi ∈ Ai.
Likewise, define θi(vi) by:
θi(vi)
△
=
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A Pr[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi((Xi(vi),αi),ω)∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A Pr[ω]Pr[α|ω]
assuming the denominator is nonzero (else, define θi(vi) = 0).
Then (21) holds by construction. Further, inequality (20) holds
because it is equivalent to (24) for the given Xi(vi) function.
The next lemma extends the random function Xi(ωi) to
Xi(ωi, αi), so that its distribution depends on both ωi and αi:
Lemma 5: Pr[α|ω] is a CE for the stochastic game if and
only if:
E [ui(t)] ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]E [uˆi ((Xi(ωi, αi),αi),ω)]
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all randomized functions
Xi(ωi, αi).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4 and is
omitted for brevity.
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As before, define φ(u1, . . . , uN) as a continuous and con-
cave function that maps ×Ni=1[0, umaxi ] to the set of real num-
bers. The goal is to choose messages M (t) = α(t) according
to a conditional probability mass function Pr[α(t)|ω(t)] that
solves the problem below:
Maximize: φ(u1, . . . , uN ) (25)
Subject to: ui =∑ω∈Ω∑α∈A π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi(α,ω)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (26)
CCE constraints (20)-(21) are satisfied (27)
Pr[α|ω] ≥ 0 ∀α ∈ A,ω ∈ Ω (28)∑
α∈A Pr[α|ω] = 1 ∀ω ∈ Ω (29)
This is a convex program in the unknowns Pr[α|ω]. The
next section presents an online solution that does not require
knowledge of the probabilities π[ω].
IV. LYAPUNOV OPTIMIZATION
For a real-valued stochastic process u(t) defined over slots
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, define:
u(t)△=
1
t
∑t−1
τ=0 E [u(τ)]
Recall that ui(t) = uˆi(α(t),ω(t)) for each player i and each
slot t. For i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, v ∈ Ωi, and β ∈ Ai, define:
u
(β)
i,v (t)
△
= uˆi ((β,αi(t)),ω(t)) 1{ωi(t) = v}
where 1{ωi(t) = v} is an indicator function that is 1 if ωi(t) =
v, and 0 else. The value u(β)i,v (t) is zero if ωi(t) 6= v, and else
it is the utility player i would receive on slot t if it uses action
β (assuming αi(t) are the actions of others).
A reformulation of (25)-(29) that does not require the deci-
sions α(t) to use the same conditional distribution Pr[α|ω]
every slot is as follows: Every slot t, the game manager
observes ω(t) and chooses an action vector α(t) ∈ A and
variables θi,v(t) to solve:
Maximize:
lim inf
t→∞
φ(u1(t), . . . , uN (t)) (30)
Subject to:
lim inf
t→∞
[
ui(t)−
∑
v∈Ωi
θi,v(t)
]
≥ 0
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (31)
lim inf
t→∞
[θi,v(t)− u
(β)
i,v (t)] ≥ 0
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀v ∈ Ωi, ∀β ∈ Ai (32)
α(t) ∈ A ∀t (33)
θi,v(t) ∈ [0, u
max
i 1{ωi(t) = v}]
∀t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀v ∈ Ωi (34)
The constraints (31) correspond to (20), and the constraints
(32) correspond to (21). Such time average problems can
be solved by stationary and randomized algorithms [11].
Specifically, if Pr[α|ω] and θi(v) are optimal variables for
problem (25)-(29), then the following is an optimal solution to
(30)-(34): Every slot t, observe ω(t) and independently choose
α(t) according to the conditional mass function Pr[α|ω],
and choose θi,v(t) = θi(v)1{ωi(t) = v}. Conversely, any
solution to (30)-(34) has the following property: For any ǫ > 0,
there is a positive integer Tǫ such that for any t > Tǫ, time
average expectations over {0, 1, . . . , t−1} produce conditional
probability mass functions Pr[α|ω] that are within ǫ of
satisfying all constraints and achieving the optimal objective
function value of problem (25)-(29). Specifically:
Pr[α|ω] =
{
1
t
∑
t−1
τ=0
E[1{α(t)=α,ω(t)=ω}]
π[ω] , if π[ω] > 0
0, if π[ω] = 0
A. Transformation via Jensen’s inequality
Using the auxiliary variable technique of [11], the problem
(30)-(34), which seeks to maximize a nonlinear function of
a time average, can be transformed into a maximization of
the time average of a nonlinear function. To this end, let
γ(t) = (γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) be an auxiliary vector that the game
manager chooses on slot t, assumed to satisfy 0 ≤ γi(t) ≤
umaxi for all t and all i. Define:
g(t)△=φ(γ1(t), . . . , γN (t))
Jensen’s inequality implies that for all slots t > 0:
g(t) ≤ φ(γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) (35)
Now consider the following problem: Every slot t ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . .} the game manager observes ω(t) and chooses
an action vector α(t) ∈ A, variables θi,v(t), and an auxiliary
vector γ(t) to solve:
Maximize:
lim inf
t→∞
g(t) (36)
Subject to:
lim
t→∞
|γi(t)− ui(t)| = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (37)
lim inf
t→∞
[
ui(t)−
∑
v∈Ωi
θi,v(t)
]
≥ 0
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (38)
lim inf
t→∞
[θi,v(t)− u
(β)
i,v (t)] ≥ 0
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀v ∈ Ωi, ∀β ∈ Ai (39)
α(t) ∈ A ∀t (40)
θi,v(t) ∈ [0, u
max
i 1{ωi(t) = v}]
∀t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀v ∈ Ωi (41)
0 ≤ γi(t) ≤ u
max
i ∀t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (42)
The problems (30)-(34) and (36)-(42) are equivalent. To see
this, let φ∗1 and φ∗2 be the optimal objective values for problems
(30)-(34) and (36)-(42), respectively. Let α∗(t) and θ∗i,v(t) be
optimal stationary and randomized decisions that solve (30)-
(34), and let u∗i △=E [uˆi(α∗(t),ω(t))] be the corresponding
expected utilities for player i. Then:
φ∗1 = φ(u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
N)
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γi(t) = u
∗
i for all t and all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, to satisfy all
constraints of the new problem (36)-(42) with (possibly sub-
optimal) objective function value g = φ∗1. Because this is not
necessarily optimal for the new problem, one has φ∗2 ≥ φ∗1.
On the other hand, let α(t), θi,v(t), and γi(t) be decisions
that solve the new problem (36)-(42). Then these same deci-
sions satisfy all constraints of the problem (30)-(34) and thus
yield an objective function value no more than φ∗1, so that:
φ∗1 ≥ lim inf
t→∞
φ(u1(t), . . . , uN (t))
= lim inf
t→∞
φ(γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) (43)
≥ lim inf
t→∞
g(t) (44)
= φ∗2 (45)
where (43) follows by (37) together with continuity of φ(·),
(44) follows by Jensen’s inequality (35), and (45) follows
because the decisions are optimal for the new problem. It
follows that φ∗1 = φ∗2. In particular, any solution to (36)-(42)
also solves (30)-(34).
B. The drift-plus-penalty algorithm
For the constraints (38), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} define a
virtual queue Qi(t) with update equation:
Qi(t+ 1) = max
[
Qi(t) +
∑
v∈Ωi
θi,v(t)− ui(t), 0
]
The above looks like a slotted time queueing equation with
arrival process
∑
v∈Ωi
θi,v(t) and service process ui(t). The
intuition is that if a control algorithm is constructed that makes
these queues mean rate stable, so that:
lim
t→∞
E [Qi(t)]
t
= 0
then constraint (38) is satisfied [11]. This queueing update can
be simplified using the identity:∑
v∈Ωi
θi,v(t) = θi,ωi(t)(t)
Hence:
Qi(t+ 1) = max[Qi(t) + θi,ωi(t)(t)− ui(t), 0] (46)
Likwewise, to enforce the constraint (39), for each i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, v ∈ Ωi, β ∈ Ai, define a virtual queue J (β)i,v (t)
with update equation:
J
(β)
i,v (t+ 1) = max[J
(β)
i,v (t) + u
(β)
i,v (t)− θi,v(t), 0] (47)
Finally, for the constraints (37), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
define a virtual queue Zi(t) with update equation:
Zi(t+ 1) = Zi(t) + γi(t)− ui(t) (48)
Define the function:
L(t) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
Zi(t)
2 +
1
2
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)
2
+
1
2
N∑
i=1
∑
v∈Ωi,β∈Ai
J
(β)
i,v (t)
2
This is called a Lyapunov function. Define ∆(t)△=L(t+ 1)−
L(t), called the Lyapunov drift on slot t. The drift-plus-penalty
algorithm is defined by choosing control actions greedily
every slot to minimize a bound on the drift-plus-penalty
expression ∆(t) − V g(t). Here, −g(t) is the “penalty” and
V is a nonnegative constant that affects a tradeoff between
convergence time and proximity to the optimal solution.
Lemma 6: For all slots t one has:
∆(t)− V g(t) ≤
B − V g(t) +
N∑
i=1
Zi(t)(γi(t)− ui(t))
+
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)(θi,ωi(t)(t)− ui(t))
+
N∑
i=1
∑
v∈Ωi,β∈Ai
J
(β)
i,v (t)(u
(β)
i,v (t)− θi,v(t)) (49)
where:
B △=
N∑
i=1
(umaxi )
2 +
1
2
N∑
i=1
|Ai|(u
max
i )
2
Proof: From (48) one has:
Zi(t+ 1)
2
2
=
Zi(t)
2
2
+
(γi(t)− ui(t))
2
2
+Zi(t)(γi(t)− ui(t))
From (46) and the fact that max[x, 0]2 ≤ x2, one has:
Qi(t+ 1)
2
2
≤
Qi(t)
2
2
+
(θi,ωi(t)(t)− ui(t))
2
2
+Qi(t)(θi,ωi(t)(t)− ui(t))
Similarly, from (47):
J
(β)
i,v (t+ 1)
2
2
≤
J
(β)
i,v (t)
2
2
+
(u
(β)
i,v (t)− θi,v(t))
2
2
+J
(β)
i,v (t)(u
(β)
i,v (t)− θi,v(t))
Summing the above yields:
∆(t) ≤ B(t) +
N∑
i=1
Zi(t)(γi(t)− ui(t))
+
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)(θi,ωi(t)(t)− ui(t))
+
N∑
i=1
∑
v∈Ωi,β∈Ai
J
(β)
i,v (t)(u
(β)
i,v (t)− θi,v(t))
where B(t) is a value that satisfies B(t) ≤ B for all t. Adding
−V g(t) to both sides proves the result.
Greedily minimizing the right-hand-side of (49) every slot
t leads to the following algorithm: Every slot t, the game
manager observes the queues Zi(t), Qi(t), J (β)i,v (t) and the
current ω(t). Then:
• Auxiliary variables γi(t): The game manager chooses
γ(t) = (γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) as the solution to:
Maximize: V φ(γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) −
∑N
i=1 Zi(t)γi(t)
Subject to: 0 ≤ γi(t) ≤ umaxi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (50)
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• Auxiliary variables θi,v(t): For each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and
v ∈ Ωi, choose θi,v(t) ∈ [0, umaxi 1{ωi(t) = v}] to
minimize:
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)θi,ωi(t)(t)−
N∑
i=1
∑
v∈Ωi,β∈Ai
J
(β)
i,v (t)θi,v(t)
• Suggested actions: Choose α(t) ∈ A1 × · · · × AN to
minimize:
−
N∑
i=1
[Zi(t) +Qi(t)]uˆi(α(t),ω(t))
+
N∑
i=1
∑
v∈Ωi,β∈Ai
J
(β)
i,v (t)uˆi ((β,αi(t)),ω(t)) 1{ωi(t) = v}
The manager then sends suggested actions αi(t) to each
(participating) player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
• Queue update: Update virtual queues via (46), (47), (48).
This is an online algorithm that does not require knowledge
of the probabilities π[ω].
C. A closer look at the algorithm
The θi,v(t) selection in the above algorithm reduces to the
following: Every slot t, observe ω(t) and the queues. Then
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and v ∈ Ωi, choose:
θi,v(t) =
{
umaxi if ωi(t) = v and Qi(t) <
∑
β∈Ai
J
(β)
i,v (t)
0 otherwise
The α(t) decisions reduce to the following: Every slot t,
observe ω(t) and the queues. Then choose α(t) ∈ A to
minimize:
−
N∑
i=1
[Zi(t) +Qi(t)]uˆi(α(t),ω(t))
+
N∑
i=1
∑
β∈Ai
J
(β)
i,ωi(t)
(t)uˆi ((β,αi(t)),ω(t))
Finally, consider the case when the fairness function is a
separable sum of individual concave functions:
φ(γ1, . . . , γN ) =
N∑
i=1
φi(γi)
Then the γ(t) decisions reduce to separately choosing γi(t) for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} as the value in the interval [0, umaxi ] that
maximizes V φi(γi(t))−Zi(t)γi(t). For example, if φi(γi) =
log(1 + γi), then:
γi(t) =
{
umaxi , if Zi(t) ≤ 0[
V
Zi(t)
− 1
]umax
i
0
, if Zi(t) > 0
where [x]a0 is defined:
[x]a0
△
=


0 if x < 0
x if 0 ≤ x ≤ a
a if x > a
D. Performance analysis
For simplicity, assume all virtual queues are initially empty,
so that L(0) = 0. Define φ∗ as the optimal value of the
objective function for (25)-(29). By equivalence of the trans-
formations, φ∗ is also the optimal value for problem (36)-(42).
Define X(t) as the vector of all virtual queues Zi(t), Qi(t),
J
(β)
i,v (t), and define ||X(t)||
△
=
√
2L(t).
Theorem 1: If L(0) = 0 and the above algorithm is imple-
mented using a fixed value V ≥ 0, then:
(a) For all slots t > 0 one has:
φ(γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) ≥ φ
∗ − B/V
(b) All virtual queues Zi(t), Qi(t), J (β)i,v (t) are mean rate
stable, so all constraints (37)-(42) are satisfied.
(c) For all slots t > 0 the virtual queue sizes satisfy:
E [||X(t)||]
t
≤
√
2B + 2V (gmax − φ∗)
t
where gmax is the maximum possible value for g(t), being
the maximum of φ(γ1, . . . , γN ) over γi ∈ [0, umaxi ] for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.3
Proof: Fix a time slot t. Given the existing queue values
Zi(t), Qi(t), J
(β)
i,v (t) and the observed ω(t), the algorithm
makes decisions γi(t), θi,v(t), α(t) to minimize the right-
hand-side of (49). Thus:
∆(t)− V g(t) ≤
B − V φ(γ∗1 (t), . . . , γ
∗
N (t))
+
N∑
i=1
Zi(t)(γ
∗
i (t)− u
∗
i (t))
+
N∑
i=1
Qi(t)(θ
∗
i,ωi(t)
(t)− u∗i (t))
+
N∑
i=1
∑
v∈Ωi,β∈Ai
J
(β)
i,v (t)(u
∗(β)
i,v (t)− θ
∗
i,v(t)) (51)
for any alternative decisions γ∗i (t), θ∗i,v(t), α∗(t) that satisfy
(41)-(42), and where:
u∗i (t)
△
= uˆi(α
∗(t),ω(t))
u
∗(β)
i,v (t)
△
= uˆi
((
β,α∗
i
(t)
)
,ω(t)
)
Now consider alternative decisions defined by the optimal
solution to problem (25)-(29). Specifically, choose α∗(t) ∈ A
to be conditionally independent of current queue states, given
the observed ω(t), according to the probability distribution
Pr[α|ω] that solves (25)-(29). Choose θ∗i,v(t) = θ∗i,v , where
θ∗i,v are the optimal values for the solution to (25)-(29). Finally,
define u∗i = E [u∗i (t)], being the expected utility of player i
under the optimal distribution Pr[α|ω], and note that:
φ(u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N ) = φ
∗
3In the special case when φ(γ1, . . . , γN ) is entrywise nondecreasing, then
gmax
△
=φ(umax1 , . . . , u
max
N
).
11
Choose γ∗i (t) = u∗i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then (20)-(21)
imply:
E [φ(γ∗1 (t), . . . , γ
∗
N (t))] = φ
∗ (52)
E [γ∗i (t)] = E [u
∗
i (t)] (53)
E
[
θ∗i,ωi(t)(t)
]
≤ E [u∗i (t)] (54)
E
[
u
∗(β)
i,v (t)
]
≤ E
[
θ∗i,v(t)
] (55)
Taking expectations of (51) and substituting (52)-(55) gives:
E [∆(t)− V g(t)] ≤ B − V φ∗
The above inequality holds for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Fix a slot
T > 0. Summing the above over slots t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1}
and using L(0) = 0 gives:
E [L(T )]− V
T−1∑
t=0
E [g(t)] ≤ BT − V φ∗T (56)
Rearranging (56) and using the definition of g(t) gives:
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E [φ(γ1(t), . . . , γN (t))] ≥ φ
∗ −
B
V
−
E [L(T )]
V T
Using Jensen’s inequality and E [L(T )] ≥ 0 proves part (a).
Again rearranging (56) gives:
E
[
||X(T )||2
]
≤ 2BT + 2V T (gmax − φ
∗)
Using the fact that E [||X(T )||]2 ≤ E
[
||X(t)||2
]
, dividing by
T 2, and taking square roots proves part (c). Part (b) follows
immediately from part (c).
Define ǫ = 1/V . Theorem 1 shows that average utility is
within O(ǫ) of optimality. Part (c) of the theorem implies
that constraint violation is within O(ǫ) after time O(1/ǫ3).
If a Slater condition holds, this convergence time is improved
to O(1/ǫ2) [11]. Similar bounds can be shown for infinite
horizon time averages (rather than time average expectations)
[20].
E. Discussion
The online algorithm ensures the constraints (38)-(39) are
satisfied. This shows that average utility of each player i is
greater than or equal to the achievable utility if the player
were to constantly use the best pure strategy. The best pure
strategy of player i is the one that uses the optimal action
α∗i (ωi) as a function of the observed ωi(t). This corresponds
to the constraints in (20)-(21). If an algorithm makes random
decisions independently every slot according to a conditional
probability mass function Pr[α|ω], then constraints (38)-(39)
imply player i cannot do better under any alternative decisions,
possibly those that mix pure strategies with different mixing
probabilities every slot. A subtlety is that the online algorithm
does not make stationary and randomized decisions. Thus, it
is not clear if a player with knowledge of the algorithm could
improve average utility by making alternative decisions that
do not correspond to a pure strategy. Of course, the online
algorithm yields time averages that correspond to a desired
Pr[α|ω]. Thus, a potential fix is to run the online algorithm
in the background and make α(t) decisions according to the
time averages that emerge.
V. SIMPLIFICATION UNDER A SPECIAL CASE
Consider the special case when there is a single random
event process ω0(t) that is known only to the game manager.
Thus, there are no random event processes ωi(t) for any player
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. This can be treated in the framework of the
previous section by formally defining the sets Ωi to consist
of a single element 0, so that ωi(t) = 0 for all slots t and
all players i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. However, this special case can
be treated more simply by removing the auxiliary variables
θi,v(t). Indeed, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all β ∈ Ai, define:
ui(t) = uˆi (α(t), ω0(t))
u
(β)
i (t) = uˆi ((β,αi(t)), ω0(t))
In this special case, the problem (36)-(42) reduces to:
Maximize:
lim inf
t→∞
g(t) (57)
Subject to:
lim
t→∞
|γi(t)− ui(t)| = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (58)
lim inf
t→∞
[
ui(t)− u
(β)
i (t)
]
≥ 0
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀β ∈ Ai (59)
α(t) ∈ A ∀t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (60)
0 ≤ γi(t) ≤ u
max
i ∀t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (61)
The above constraints are different from (36)-(42) because the
variables θi,v(t) have been removed, the constraint (39) has
been removed, and the constraint (38) has been modified to
(59).
Since the constraint (58) is identical to constraint (37), it is
enforced by the same virtual queue Zi(t) with update equation
given in (48). However, the constraint (59) is enforced by the
following new constraint for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and β ∈ Ai:
Q
(β)
i (t+ 1) = max[Q
(β)
i (t) + u
(β)
i (t)− ui(t), 0] (62)
The resulting algorithm is as follows: Every slot t, the game
manager observes the queues Zi(t), Q(β)i (t) and the current
ω0(t). Then:
• Auxiliary variables γi(t): Choose (γ1(t), . . . , γN (t)) as
before (that is, according to (50)).
• Suggested actions: Choose α(t) ∈ Ai × · · · × AN to
minimize:
−
N∑
i=1

Zi(t) + ∑
β∈Ai
Q
(β)
i (t)

 uˆi(α(t), ω0(t))
+
N∑
i=1
∑
β∈Ai
Q
(β)
i (t)uˆi((β,αi(t)), ω0(t))
• Virtual queue udpate: Update queues Zi(t) and Q(β)i (t)
via (48) and (62).
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In this special case when no player observes any random
events, the set of pure strategies for each player i coincides
with the set of actions Ai. Thus, this algorithm is the same as
that given in the conference version of this paper [1], where
it is shown to give performance similar to that of Theorem 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considered a simple game structure for repeated
stochastic games. Every slot a random vector ω(t) is gener-
ated by nature. Players observe different components of this
vector and then choose individual actions with the help of
a game manager. A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) for
this stochastic game was defined to ensure that participating
players earn at least as much utility as they could earn by
individually deviating (and hence receiving no help from the
manager). The paper considered optimizing a concave function
of the vector of time average utilities (called a fairness func-
tion), subject to the CCE constraints. Lyapunov optimization
was used to solve the problem over time, without requiring
knowledge of the probabilities for the ω(t) process. Similar
techniques can be used to enforce correlated equilibrium (CE)
constraints.
APPENDIX A — PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Suppose Pr[s] and Pr[α|ω] satisfy (16). The following
identities are useful. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} one has:∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi(α,ω) =
∑
s∈S
Pr[s]hi(s) (63)
This can be proven by substituting (16) into the left-hand-
side of (63) and using (12). Likewise, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
and any pure strategy function b(ri)i (ωi) for player i (where
ri ∈ Si), one has:∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi((b
(ri)
i (ωi),αi),ω)
=
∑
s∈S
Pr[s]hi(ri, si) (64)
Proof: (Lemma 2a) Suppose Pr[α|ω] satisfies the con-
straints (20)-(21). Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Substituting (63) into
the left-hand-side of (20) gives:∑
s∈S
Pr[s]hi(s) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(ωi) (65)
Now fix an index ri ∈ Si. For each vi ∈ Ωi, define βi =
b
(ri)
i (vi). Substituting this βi into (21) gives:∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(vi)
≥
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi((b
(ri)
i (vi),αi),ω)
Summing the above over all vi ∈ Ωi and using (64) gives:∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(vi) ≥
∑
s∈S
Pr[s]hi(ri, si)
Combining the above with (65) proves that the constraints (14)
hold.
Now Suppose Pr[s] satisfies the constraints (14). For each
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and vi ∈ Ωi, define the function bi(vi) as the
action βi ∈ Ai that maximizes:∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi ((βi,αi),ω)
Define θi(vi) as the corresponding maximum divided by∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A π[ω]Pr[α|ω]. Then constraints (21) hold
by construction. Now let ri be the index for the pure strategy
of player i that selects actions according to the function bi(vi).
Then:∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(vi)
=
∑
ω∈Ω|ωi=vi
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi((b
(ri)
i (vi),αi),ω) (66)
Summing the above over all vi ∈ Ωi gives:∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]θi(ωi)
=
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi((b
(ri)
i (ωi),αi),ω)
=
∑
s∈S
Pr[s]hi(ri, si) (67)
≤
∑
s∈S
Pr[s]hi(s) (68)
=
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]uˆi(α,ω) (69)
where (67) follows from (64), (68) follows from (14), and (69)
follows from (63). Thus, the constraints (20) hold.
The proof of Lemma 2b is similar to that of Lemma 2a and
is omitted for brevity.
Proof: (Lemma 2c) Suppose Pr[s] is a NE of the virtual
static game. Then it has the product form (13). Lemma 1
ensures that the corresponding Pr[α|ω] has the product form
(17). Further, because Pr[s] satisfies (14), Lemma 2a ensures
that Pr[α|ω] satisfies (20)-(21). Hence, Pr[α|ω] is a NE for
the stochastic game.
VII. APPENDIX B — PROOF THAT EstocNE ⊆ EstocCE
Suppose that Pr[α|ω] is a NE for the stochastic game, so
that it has the product form (17) and satisfies the constraints
(20)-(21). Suppose Pr[α|ω] is not a CE for the stochastic
game, so that constraints (22)-(23) are not satisfied. The goal
is to reach a contradiction.
Since the constraints (22)-(23) are not satisfied, by Lemma
5 it follows that there exists a player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and a
randomized function Xi(ωi, αi) for which:
E [ui(t)] <∑
ω∈Ω
∑
α∈A
π[ω]Pr[α|ω]E [uˆi((Xi(ωi, αi),αi),ω)] (70)
Because the product form property (17) holds, one has:
Pr[α|ω] = Pr[αi|ωi]
∏
j 6=i
Pr[αj |ωj ] (71)
13
Now consider the following alternative strategy for player i,
based only on knowledge of its observed ωi (without knowl-
edge of αi): Define the random action X˜i(ωi) that observes
ωi, independently generates a random element α˜i ∈ Ai
according to the conditional distribution Pr[αi|ωi], and then
defines X˜i(ωi) = Xi(ωi, α˜i). This policy uses the conditional
distribution associated with the actual αi value, but does not
require knowledge of this actual value. Define vali as the
expected utility of player i under this alternative randomized
strategy X˜i(ωi):
vali
△
=
∑
ω∈Ω
π[ω]
∑
α
i
∈A
i
∑
α˜i∈Ai
∏
j 6=i
Pr[αj |ωj]Pr[α˜i|ωi]×
E [uˆi((Xi(ωi, α˜i),αi),ω)]
By (71), vali is the same as the right-hand-side of (70), and so
E [ui(t)] < vali. On the other hand, since Pr[α|ω] is a NE for
the stochastic game, Lemma 4 ensures that no such alternative
randomized strategy X˜i(ωi) can improve the average utility
of player i, so that E [ui(t)] ≥ vali. This is the desired
contradiction.
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